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Voluntary Obligation and Contract
Aditi Bagchi*
Absent mistake or misrepresentation, most scholars assume that parties 
who agree to contract do so voluntarily. Scholars tend further to 
regard that choice as an important exercise in moral agency. Hanoch 
Dagan and Michael Heller are right to question the quality of our 
choices. Where the fundamental contours of the transaction are legally 
determined, parties have little opportunity to exercise autonomous 
choice over the terms on which they deal with others. To the extent 
that our choices in contract do not reflect our individual moral 
constitutions — our values, virtues, vices, the set of reasons we reject 
and the set of reasons we endorse — we are not justified in regulating 
contracts reluctantly. Contracts are entitled to the privilege of liberal 
regulatory deference only to the extent that they are the work product 
of individual autonomy. The assumption that contract is voluntary 
does enormous work in most normative theories of contract. This 
Article takes still more seriously the obstacles to autonomous choice 
that contracting parties face. The most important constraints are not 
in contract law itself but in the material and moral imperatives that 
dictate parties’ contracting preferences. Many contracts are driven by 
circumstantial considerations or actual background obligations. While 
these contracts are not wholly lacking in the element of voluntariness, 
we should distinguish them from those choices — and those contracts 
— which more fully realize our potential to self-consciously author 
our relations with others. Autonomous choice in contract requires 
more than Dagan and Heller imply, and it is likely beyond the power 
of contract law standing alone to deliver it.
IntroductIon
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller rightly celebrate choice in the domain of 
contract. Framing the moment of decision to contract as a matter of choice 
* Cite as: Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 TheoreTical 
inquiries L. 433 (2019).
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is a useful departure from the usual question of voluntariness. The decision 
to enter contract is usually cast as either voluntary or not. But it is natural to 
ask how many choices a person had and of what kind. Thinking about the 
choices people have when they enter contract makes apparent that the most 
normatively attractive dimension of contract is not binary.
Choice is ultimately significant, though, for the same reasons that we care 
whether the decision to contract was voluntary. While promotion of choice is 
a means of promoting the quintessentially liberal interest in autonomy, it is 
also important to explain the normative status that we confer on promise and 
consent in the contractual context. Contract imposes burdensome, sometimes 
regrettable obligations and triggers state-enforced liability. Those burdens 
are accepted, individually and systematically, because they are regarded as 
self-assumed. Thus, redeeming the choice to contract — the task that Dagan 
and Heller set out for themselves — is a matter of not just bettering contract 
law but also ensuring that it is internally consistent, inasmuch as many 
doctrines and policies assume that parties entered agreements voluntarily in 
some meaningful sense.
Part I begins by discussing Dagan and Heller’s treatment of choice and 
comparing it with the idea of voluntariness. I agree strongly with their central 
normative argument that liberal contract law should promote as wide a possible 
menu of contract types so that the choice to enter into agreement with a given 
structure is a meaningful one. I spend some time elaborating why the bare fact 
of voluntariness, understood in binary terms, does not properly capture what 
is normatively significant about contractual undertakings. Contract reflects 
moral agency not just because we can choose not to contract at all, but because 
the way we contract, or how we exercise normative power, reflects our moral 
makeup. Although this point motivates Dagan and Heller’s project, and though 
the kinds of choices on which Dagan and Heller focus are important, the choice 
among contract types is not among the most important choices people make 
in contract. Expanding the menu of contract types would do little to expand 
more salient choices. Dagan and Heller seem to realize this and their focus 
reflects the limited tool that is contract law. But the voluntariness of contract 
is not primarily a function of contract law and cannot be secured by it.
The two most important classes of constraint are material and moral 
constraints. The last two Parts of the Article elaborate on those limits to 
the voluntariness of contract. Part II  argues that the moral significance of 
exercising normative powers turns on those constraints, and Part III  focuses 
on those constraints in the context of contract. The upshot is that our choice 
to contract is not the full-blown moment of moral agency that we associate 
with the simple exercise of normative power. Voluntariness in contract is 
less morally significant than we might ordinarily take it to be. Because the 
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premise of voluntariness does so much work to justify the deference that 
both judges and legislators afford private agreement, that deference should 
be adjusted — before and after contract. 
I. choIce, VoluntarIness and the Moral  
sIgnIfIcance of norMatIVe Power
Contractual obligations are quintessentially voluntary obligations. Voluntariness 
distinguishes them most readily from the involuntary duties of tort. Most 
theories of contract attach great significance to the fact that parties entered 
the agreement voluntarily. In legal economics, voluntariness gives rise to our 
confidence that parties are better off as a result of the agreement. In promissory 
theory, the service of one kind or another that the institution of contract 
performs for the normative power of promise assumes that promises are made 
voluntarily.1 Similarly, consent theory predicates the authority of the state to 
impose contractual liability on a defendant on her having previously agreed 
to subject herself to such liability.2 On this view too, the voluntary exercise 
of a normative power, i.e. consent, justifies the entire edifice of contract.
The central role of voluntariness in contract is easy to understand given 
the theoretical centrality of normative powers to our understanding of how 
contracts get off the ground. Normative powers are recognized as such because 
they advance the autonomy of moral agents, and liberal states are particularly 
committed to the autonomy of their citizens. Because it is the premise of 
liberal theories of the state, liberal theories of any particular legal subject (like 
contract law) are similarly committed to respecting autonomy. Autonomy is 
sometimes construed as abiding by its perfect requirements, and at other times 
as advancing a sprawling autonomy interest wherever possible, given other 
legitimate interests of the state. Dagan and Heller use the concept of autonomy 
in the latter sense, which is why they are able to speak constructively of how 
the liberal state can advance autonomy by adding to the menu of choices 
available to contracting parties.
1 For promissory theories of contract, which presume promises to be voluntary, see, 
for example, charles Fried, conTracT as Promise: a Theory oF conTracTual 
obligaTion 14 (1981); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, 
and Conventionalism, 117 Phil. rev. 481, 502 (2008); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Are Contracts Promises?, in The rouTledge comPanion To PhilosoPhy oF law 
241 (Andrei Marmour ed., 2012); Daniel Markovits, Contracts and Collaboration, 
113 yale l. J. 1417 (2004).
2 See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 colum. l. rev. 269 
(1986).
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We are right to celebrate normative powers and the space we create for 
them in contract. Exercise of a normative power like promise or consent 
reveals something important about an agent and her moral capacities. It tells 
us that she is the kind of person who others regard as capable of authoring 
obligation, or capable of releasing others from their obligations. It tells us 
that she is what we recognize as a moral agent.
But it does not tell us much more than that, and there is more to know 
about a moral agent than the fact that she is one. That an obligation was 
assumed voluntarily does not tell us how important the agent was to the fact 
of its adoption, let alone its form or content; it does not answer how much of 
a voluntary obligation is explained by the moral makeup of its author. Even 
within the set of obligations created by an agent (through exercise of a normative 
power) there is variation in the degree to which the content of obligations can 
be sourced to her moral qualities, i.e., her values and commitments, virtues 
and vices. An agent’s normative power (to make promises, issue permissions, 
etc.) is not her only or most important moral attribute.
In drawing moral distinctions among the motivations behind action, my 
discussion here might vaguely resemble the Kantian scheme that racially 
prioritizes autonomous over heteronomous ends. But there are at least two 
important differences: First, I am not claiming here that one kind of motivation 
is superior or more valuable — indeed, more human — than another, all 
things considered. I am claiming only that some motivations in the exercise 
of normative powers render the resulting normative position more voluntary. 
I do not presume that voluntariness is the highest moral aim; only that, where 
we can describe our moral position in some respect as voluntary, that feature is 
of substantial value to moral agents. Second, the moral imprint which I argue 
is valuable to moral agents is not the mark of pure reason in the Kantian sense. 
In fact, it is presumptively not universal or common to all agents; it reflects 
the particular moral makeup of a single agent, including her conception of 
the good and her ethical character. It would not do, in a Kantian scheme, to 
have moral duties turn on such contingent aspects of a person. People are 
bound by the categorical imperative by virtue of their essential features as 
moral agents.
Voluntary obligations, unlike mandatory duties, are the moral work-
product of particular agents. The concept of voluntary obligation in turn is 
most constructive when it captures both whether an obligation is the product 
of moral agency and the degree to which the obligation reflects moral agency. 
We usefully regard all obligations that are the output of a normative power 
as voluntary — but along a continuum of voluntariness.
Dagan and Heller do not talk about moral agency or moral imprint, but 
they are similarly interested in the context in which choices are made. They 
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agree with Joseph Raz that “freedom requires individuals be able to choose 
from among options they deem valuable.”3 The critical implication they 
draw from his conception of autonomy is that contract law must support 
“freedom to choose from among diverse, normatively attractive contract 
types in each important area of human interaction. Free people are defined 
in part by the attractive choices they reject, not just those they select.”4 The 
most important contribution of the choice theory is to challenge the implicit 
assumption in much of contract theory that the bare fact that the parties have 
accepted a contract makes the agreement morally valuable. It is a challenge 
rather than a rejection of this principle, because no one is prepared to say that 
the compromised character of most choice makes those choices altogether 
normatively uninteresting. But because their brand of liberalism holds that 
the state is bound to promote autonomy and not merely to abide by some 
boundaries it creates, Dagan and Heller offer a compelling argument why 
parties must be able to choose among types of contracts within a given sphere 
of human activity for their choice to be “free,” or on my terms, for it robustly 
to reflect their moral agency.
It is at once odd and understandable that Dagan and Heller focus on 
“contract types” as the relevant kind of choice that must be available to 
contracting parties. They are clear that diversity of contract types is not 
sufficient for contractual autonomy,5 but any claim about “contract types” is 
a curiously small (though substantial on its own terms) conclusion to draw 
from their starting proposition that it is the “obligation of liberal contract law 
to support choice within each familiar category of human activity.”6 State 
recognition of different types of contractual arrangements, even its facilitation 
of a formal menu of options, does not ensure choice among those options 
in any familiar category of human activity. The primary constraints on our 
contractual choices are material and moral. It is nevertheless understandable 
that Dagan and Heller do not address those constraints at any length because 
it is not clear that it is within the institutional capacity of contract law to do 
anything to relieve parties of those constraints.
Still, Dagan and Heller’s shift to “choice” from the more familiar language 
of voluntariness might have lent itself to considering these dimensions of the 
decision to contract. Rather than focus on the blunt decision to contract at 
all, they themselves emphasize that the normative significance of that choice 
turns on what other choices were available to parties. They are right that the 
3 hanoch dagan & michael heller, The choice Theory oF conTracTs 69 (2017).
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 71.
6 Id. at 97.
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moral import of choosing to enter a given contract turns on the alternatives 
available, but their decision to focus on the kinds of contract recognized or 
enabled by the state, as opposed to the kinds of contract possible in a given 
market, is unexplained. Moreover, their focus on a menu of contracting 
possibilities potentially deflects the importance of moral constraints on choice, 
which undermine the value of formal possibilities in a different way than do 
material constraints.
Consider the example of employment types. Dagan and Heller rightly 
criticize the stark choice between the status of employee and independent 
contractor.7 But the vast majority of people do not make any such choice; they 
take what is available or maximize their income. It would not help them if 
there were intermediate categories recognized in employment law. Although 
Dagan and Heller acknowledge that employees face market constraints and 
provide that something must be done to protect choice for the least privileged 
employees, it is not clear how, from the standpoint of autonomy, expanding 
the menu of contract types in this sphere importantly advances employees’ 
interests. In order for the array of employment types to be relevant, employees 
need to be in a position to pay for their preferences; i.e., they need to be in 
a position to trade off income in exchange for a contractual relationship that 
suits them in other respects. The people who are able to do that are already 
pretty well-positioned from the standpoint of choice and their frustration at 
the crude legal categories they must choose among is not a pressing social 
problem.
More generally, it is wrong to focus on the state as a direct regulator of 
individual transactions (closest to its role as adjudicator of individual disputes) 
as opposed to its broader role as a regulator and participant in the market. It 
is in the latter role that it has the capacity to affect the material conditions 
under which parties make contract choices — in every realm, including the 
domestic sphere. It is likely that using all of its powers, it has the capacity 
even to affect the moral calculation that parties face when entering agreements, 
since it controls the background conditions for both parties as well as their 
prospective risks. But, using contract law alone, the state can do little to 
expand the choices available to contracting parties. In a world of autonomous 
contracting, individual agreements are the building blocks by which we make 
our lives and the sum of our agreements represents a kind of moral work-
product. But choice among contract types will not achieve that liberal ideal.
The next two Parts consider constraints on choice that are not a part of 
Dagan and Heller’s picture, or at least, they do not figure prominently in their 
normative agenda. However, these constraints are the most serious threats to 
7 Id. at 117-18.
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the robust voluntariness that they promote. Although Dagan and Heller allow 
that freedom of choice is not assured through the expansion of contract types, 
their qualification is much larger and deeper than their discussion suggests. 
Material and moral constraints on contractual choice cut at the heart of the 
attribution of voluntariness that is the basis for treating contract as a valuable 
exercise of normative power.
II. degrees of VoluntarIness In the exercIse of  
norMatIVe Powers
Promise and consent are the two normative powers most closely associated 
with contract. In both cases, we recognize the normative power because 
the control it gives us over our normative position is said to advance our 
autonomy. The following discussion is intended to show that the extent to 
which exercise of these normative powers advances our autonomy interest 
depends on material and moral constraints. The conclusion is not that promise 
or consent are not ultimately justified principles. The modest claim is instead 
that the weight assigned to moral reasons rooted in the principles of promise 
or consent should be adjusted to reflect variations in the voluntariness that is 
the basis for their normative value to us.
A. Material Constraints
Contractual promises are often made under circumstances in which the 
promisor feels she has no choice but to promise whatever is necessary to 
obtain a good, service or other compensation. Contract scholars point out 
that waivers in consumer contracts are routine and unavoidable.8 Of course, 
not all promises are necessary. Promises and permissions vary in the degree 
to which they are driven by material circumstance.
A farmer might feel compelled to promise to help with his neighbors’ 
harvests because he thinks that is his best shot at obtaining similar help from 
his neighbors, and he has no alternative to such help. Another farmer promises 
to help because he hates the prospect of the harvest going to waste. Still 
8 See, e.g., margareT Jane radin, boilerPlaTe: The Fine PrinT, vanishing righTs 
and The rule oF law (2012); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 harv. l. rev. 529, 529 (1971). 
Even judges not associated with the cause of consumer advocacy understand 
waivers to be unavoidable. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1750 (2011) (“the times in which consumer contracts were anything other 
than adhesive are long past.”). 
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another farmer promises to help because he enjoys hard work and wishes to 
be a good neighbor. Only the first promise is made out of material constraint: 
A promise or waiver made of material constraint is made with the expectation 
of receiving some material benefit, or avoiding some material loss. Some but 
not all promises and permissions are of this sort.
We do not regard promises and permissions induced by material need as 
coerced as long as the constellation of entitlements that gave rise to them was 
a legitimate one. By contrast, if someone permits another to use her property 
in order to avoid being killed by that person then we would say the permission 
is not voluntary (and therefore not binding) because the permission would 
not have been granted had her background entitlements been respected. (As 
discussed above, this is similar to the way the doctrine of duress operates in 
contract, except that it is neutral as to the source of illegitimacy. Only threats 
of material harm from the other contracting party that are inconsistent with 
background entitlements are regarded as improper threats for purposes of 
duress analysis.) There is an important difference between promises and 
permissions that reflect “real” background entitlements and promises that 
are the product of threats which the promisee/grantee has no right to carry 
out; the latter are not voluntary at all and we have no collective interest in 
enforcing them.9
But there is further difference within the set of voluntary promises: a 
spectrum between those that are entirely gratuitous and have no material 
motive and those which a person feels compelled to make in order to secure 
a material benefit or avoid a material harm.
Why should a promise made with material motive be regarded as less 
voluntary than one made without such motive? Not because there is anything 
inherent in the concept of voluntariness at odds with material constraint, 
but because the normative significance of voluntariness turns at least in part 
9 It is not obvious why promises that are coerced by a promisee should be regarded 
as involuntary while promises otherwise forced are regarded as voluntary. But it 
is easier to see that we have no reason to use the force of law to back promises 
which are coercively extracted by promisees, such that they are at least functionally 
involuntary. See John Deigh, Promises Under Fire, 112 eThics 483, 485-89 
(2002). Deigh observes a “disparity between the modern philosophers’ ideal 
of morality and the actual moral practice by or through which people become 
bound to keep their word.” Id. at 484. He implies that the tendency to idealize 
promise may cause philosophers to dismiss too quickly coerced promises as 
involuntary. This Article targets the same idealism by recasting voluntariness 
in a way that accounts for normatively significant variation in the practice of 
promise.
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on the idea that those making voluntary choices are able to thereby pursue 
values and preferences.
The normative power of making binding promises is sometimes recognized 
on the grounds that it facilitates valuable relationships, or more generally 
makes it possible to shape one’s moral world. I do not aim to propose a theory 
of promising as such but pull as a common element from most accounts 
of promising that the recognition of the practice enhances moral agency.10 
Promising makes it possible to impose an imprint on one’s own moral world, 
whether generally or through its specific aspects, such as one’s relationships 
with others. The imprint reflects something about oneself, one’s conceptions 
of the good or life plan.
To the extent that a particular promise is entirely determined by material 
constraints, it does not reflect anything specific about the promisor/grantor 
and her particular values and preferences. To the extent that it is literally 
necessary to make a promise in order to eat, for example, the promise reflects 
facts about the promisor that she has in common with all animals. It is not 
easily recognizable as an exercise of moral agency.
It is nevertheless an act of moral agency and, for that reason, a commitment 
made from a position of material constraint is still a promise. We still recognize 
the promise as a voluntary commitment because one can always formally 
choose not to make it and there is a sense in which other animals cannot make 
that choice. In most but not all cases, there are also other promises — with 
slightly different content, or to other promisees — that one could make in 
order to meet the same material need. 
Recognizing normative power in these circumstances is also a way of 
salvaging agency. By continuing to respect her power to make binding promises 
and issue effective permissions, we collectively construct the promisor/grantor 
as a moral agent even if the scope of her agency is severely constrained. 
Normative powers are not a function of inherent human capacities but can 
be realized only through others. Whether one is capable of shaping one’s 
normative relations with others turns at least in part on whether others perceive 
you as so capable, e.g., whether they are willing to accept your promises, to 
treat you as bound and rely on your commitment.11 Denying agency is thus 
10 See, e.g., David Owens, A Simple Theory of Promising, 115 Phil. rev. 51 
(2006); Jody Kraus, Personal Sovereignty and Normative Power Skepticism, 
109 colum. l. rev. sidebar 126, 131 (2009). See also David Owens, Duress, 
Deception and the Validity of a Promise, 116 mind 293, 309-12 (2007).
11 There are a number of senses in which this could be true. First, as a pragmatic 
matter, we may be unable to avail ourselves of the benefits of institutions like 
promise unless others regard us as capable of promise-making. Second, promises 
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self-defeating, especially in societies characterized by substantial inequality. 
A severe conception of agency that renders it an elite phenomenon would 
only forfeit the liberating potential of the concept of agency, as a mandate 
on which to expand choice and self-authorship. Although one cannot attach 
the property of voluntariness to an obligation by willing it so, the voluntary 
framework of contract minimizes the risk that we artificially close off avenues 
for moral agency for people within their material constraints.
Finally, material constraint is an important part of our experience of the 
world and our sense of how we relate to it.12 It cannot be regarded as an alien 
or occasional constraint that carves out territory from our moral space or there 
would be little left. In this respect, the inquiry into the nature of contractual 
voluntariness is comparable to an inquiry into the nature of responsibility in 
tort. Just as liability is imposed in contract only where a party breaches an 
obligation she voluntarily assumed, liability is imposed in tort only where a 
party is responsible for the injury of another.
In the course of litigation, a plaintiff needs to show that a contractual 
obligation was voluntarily assumed, or in tort, that a defendant is responsible 
for her loss. But the theoretical challenge in contract and tort, respectively, is 
not really to determine whether contractual obligation is voluntary as a general 
matter, or whether those who negligently cause injury are responsible, as a 
general matter — as if settling a metaphysical truth. Rather, we take as our 
starting point the strong premises of the legal institutions we observe. We 
presume the “fact” of voluntariness where there is evidence of agreement and 
we presume the “fact” of responsibility where plaintiff can show duty, breach 
and causation. We try to make sense of “voluntariness” and “responsibility” 
on these thin conditions notwithstanding competing moral intuitions.
In the case of contract, confidence about voluntariness is undermined by the 
overwhelming constraint under which voluntary choices tend to be made; in the 
and permissions may require acceptance and will not be accepted by others if 
they do not believe in the moral agency of the would-be promisor/grantor. Third, 
normative powers may have no transcendental reality; they are intersubjectively 
constituted. The point in text requires only that, for one reason or another, moral 
agency depends on mutual recognition.
12 Although this Article is concerned with the question of whether choices are 
voluntary, it is also worth observing that our choices may be important for 
reasons quite separate from their voluntariness, and in some cases, for reasons 
in direct tension with voluntariness. For example, some regard our dependencies 
as essential to our human identity and locate value in dependent relationships, 
especially where they are mutual. Material and moral constraints that reflect 
those dependencies might be valuable, from this perspective. Nevertheless, they 
undercut the voluntary character of choice.
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case of tort, the related struggle has been to reconcile agent responsibility with 
the limits of agent control.13 Tort scholars revealed something important about 
responsibility in ordinary tort actions by excavating the concept of outcome 
responsibility, which is less robust than culpability but still a pervasive kind 
of moral responsibility.14 Outcome responsibility attaches to an agent who 
controls and foresees an outcome even if she did not desire or specifically 
intend it.15 Outcome responsibility makes sense of why we hold people 
responsible for outcomes that they did not wish to bring about and that they 
might well have avoided with better luck (such as accidents caused by their 
negligence). It does so by distinguishing the kind of responsibility at issue 
in ordinary tort actions from culpability, a more robust kind of responsibility 
usually at issue in criminal law.
Similarly, we can make sense of voluntariness in contract by recognizing 
that market-constrained promises are not as valuable or morally significant as 
others; they exhibit only the lowest rung of voluntariness. The promise to buy 
disability insurance at a particular price point is less revealing of our moral 
agency than a promise to care for a loved one in time of illness.  But though 
it is a thin form of voluntariness, in the way that outcome responsibility is 
a relatively thin form of moral responsibility, we still recognize the kind of 
choices we make under material constraint as voluntary. We could not recognize 
ourselves as agents mired in the world without a concept of voluntariness 
that encompasses such choices.16
13 See Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make 
Sense?, 6 law & Phil. 1, 22-23 (1987); Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 legal Theory 181, 181 (2006); John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 cornell l. 
rev. 1123, 1132-63 (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and 
Massive Loss, in PhilosoPhical FoundaTions oF TorT law 387, 389-91 (David 
G. Owen ed., 1995).
14 See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 iowa l. rev. 
449, 505-07 (1992).
15 See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, 
in PhilosoPhy and The law oF TorTs 72, 92 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
16 This claim is intended to be parallel to the claims made on behalf of outcome 
responsibility. See Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 law q. rev. 
530, 543 (1988) (“If actions and outcomes were not ascribed to us on the basis 
of our bodily movements and their mental accompaniments, we could have 
no continuing history or character.”); see also John Gardner, Obligations and 
Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in relaTing To resPonsibiliTy: essays For Tony 
honoré on his eighTieTh birThday 111, 136 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 
2001) (“To deny that success can have independent rational significance is to 
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We thus have good reason to regard even a promise made under substantial 
material constraint as voluntary. Nevertheless, they do not carry the full 
value associated with promise and permission because they reflect little more 
than the moral capacities of the promisor/grantor; they are neither evidence 
nor consequence of her particular moral makeup. If we do not unpack the 
moral significance of promising and assess whether promises equally serve 
the underlying values which cause us to value promises as such, we miss 
normatively significant variation among promises and we risk rendering the 
crude label of “voluntary” implausible.
B. Moral Constraints
Just as some but not all promises reflect material constraint, some but not all 
promises are made under moral constraint. We should distinguish between 
compulsory and supererogatory promises in order to understand the wide-range 
spectrum of voluntariness. A compulsory promise is a promise not to commit 
(what would already be) a wrong. 17 A supererogatory promise is a promise 
to do something one is not otherwise obligated to do.18 Compare my promise 
not to steal your car to my promise to give you my car. Both promises create 
voluntary obligations: in one case, a freestanding obligation, and in the other, 
an obligation layered over a background duty. The supererogatory promise 
is more robustly voluntary than a promise not to be wicked.
Two objections might be raised against this distinction. First, one might 
argue that promising to do what one is already obligated to do is not a promise 
at all. Alternatively, one might claim that a compulsory promise is “just as 
leave us without any story of our lives as practical reasoners.”); Perry, supra note 
15, at 72, 83 (“[O]utcome-responsibility in the achievement sense comprises a 
fundamental element in our understanding of our own agency.”).
17 As discussed below, compulsory promises are not actually mandatory. They 
are made in service of involuntary duties. The boundary between apparently 
voluntary obligation and involuntary duty is not as sure as it is analytically 
convenient. Many of the involuntary duties that motivate compulsory promises 
are imperfect; for that reason, the particular promises made are not compelled. 
I nevertheless characterize those as compulsory rather than supererogatory, to 
distinguish them from promises that do not further compliance with any duty.
18 Supererogatory here describes acts beyond the requirements of duty. Supererogatory 
promises may promise more than is required or they may promise where no 
promise is required. Note that I do not treat the compulsory/supererogatory 
divide as a categorical. Most promises are morally motivated and not entirely 
gratuitous, so their compulsory or supererogatory character is a matter of degree. 
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good” a promise as promising to do something one has no pre-existing duty 
to do. Both objections fail.
1. Compulsory Promises Are Real Promises
The idea of a compulsory promise sounds paradoxical. But we should not 
confuse a promise that is morally necessary (as are compulsory promises) 
with a promise that is literally compelled. So many promises are morally 
necessary that removing all such promises from the concept of promise would 
shrink the practice beyond the point of recognition.
Imagine you have promised a friend that you will help her pack her 
belongings when her lease ends in two months. When the date approaches, 
before she books a moving company, she calls to confirm that you will fulfill 
your earlier promise. Besides the passage of time, nothing new or surprising 
has taken place since the initial promise was made. You acknowledge the 
earlier promise and promise to keep it.
One might argue that the second promise is not a promise at all. The 
intuition would be that the promise not to break the earlier promise adds 
nothing.19 You do not acquire an obligation to do anything new. But the 
second promise gives you a new moral reason to do what you were supposed 
to do already. The action at issue in the new obligation was keeping your 
promise, and the compulsory promise created a new reason for keeping it. 
The ultimate action content of an obligation may be the same as that in a 
preexisting duty; moral reasons may be layered over one another such that 
the moral character of action is overdetermined. Still, a person who breaks a 
promise commits one wrong by doing so; the person who breaks a promise 
to keep a promise commits two.
The question whether compulsory promises constitute valid promises 
relates to another that David Owen has addressed: is it possible to make a 
wicked promise that is morally binding? That is, can it be wrong, by virtue 
of a promise, not to perform some act that it is clearly wrong, all things 
considered, to perform? He argues persuasively that it is possible to make 
such a promise and that it is ill-conceived to dismiss the promise as ineffective 
merely because the reason for action that it creates can be trumped by other 
duties.20 The upshot of that discussion is that the validity or efficacy of a 
promise does not turn on background reasons for or against the performance 
19 Joseph DeMarco and Richard Fox call these “superfluous promises.” See Joseph 
DeMarco & Richard Fox, Putting Pressure on Promises, 30 souThern J. Phil. 
45, 53 (1992).
20 david owens, shaPing The normaTive landscaPe (2012). But see Seana Shiffrin, 
Immoral, Conflicting and Redundant Promises, in reasons and recogniTion: 
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of the promise. Just as reasons not to perform an act do not make a promise 
to perform that act ineffective — but mean that one must commit a wrong in 
order to avoid committing a greater wrong — similarly, existing reasons to 
perform an act do not make a promise to perform that act ineffective. They 
render the failure to perform the act a double wrong. Wicked promises are 
real promises, and compulsory promises are too.
The validity of a promise to do what one is already required to do is related 
to the more intuitive possibility of voluntarily performing an act one is also 
duty-bound to perform. For example, if a friend suggests that you visited 
her in the hospital out of a sense of obligation alone, you might protest that 
you came voluntarily. In this context, one means that one would have acted 
the same even in the absence of duty. Similarly, someone who refrains from 
committing the crime of murder might insist that she has voluntarily declined 
to commit the act of murder. In both cases, we can recognize the choice to 
perform or not to perform an action as voluntary, notwithstanding background 
duties. Promising to do what is morally required is voluntary in a similar sense.
Compulsory promises are properly regarded as voluntary, and more generally 
as valid promises, because they are not literally compulsory. First, although a 
promisor may be already compelled to perform some act related to the content 
of her promise, she is rarely required to promise to perform the act. Thus, 
even if showing up on time for work is compulsory in a given circumstance, 
making an additional promise to show up on time is not compulsory. Second, 
although a promisor may be compelled to perform some act related to the 
content of her promise, she is not usually compelled to perform the particular 
act she promises. The background duty is indeterminate with respect to 
particular courses of action. For example, though I may be duty-bound to 
discuss my client’s case with her, I am not duty-bound to discuss the case at 
9 am on Monday — until I promise to do so. 
One might be tempted, as was Patrick Atiyah, to dismiss promises I 
characterize as voluntary, but less voluntary than supererogatory promises, as 
simply involuntary.21 But this not only overlooks some important features of 
compulsory promises, it is also inconsistent with our experience of compulsory 
promising.
The choice to promise and the choice to promise a particular thing are not 
just formal features of promising that render them voluntary. These elements 
of choice in compulsory promising make it a meaningful exercise in normative 
essays on The PhilosoPhy oF T.m. scanlon 155, 156 (J. Wallace ed., 2011) 
(rejecting immoral promises as true promises).
21 See P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 law q. 
Rev. 193 (1978).
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judgment. One can choose to weigh oneself down with additional obligation 
in order to strengthen the hand of another person, who would otherwise be 
at the whim of your future self and its later judgment about the content of 
your duty; or one can choose to minimize the moral fallout of a bad choice 
down the line. In choosing the manner in which one will fulfill some flexible, 
background duty, one weighs that duty against other moral and amoral interests. 
These choices in compulsory promising reflect something about the moral 
makeup of a promisor, even if they are less driven by her values and plans 
than are supererogatory promises.
Compulsory promises are not only technically voluntary, they are also 
experienced that way. Our experience of them is important to how we 
conceptualize them and their normative significance. In principle, a person 
subject to a duty to perform an act A has no choice but to perform that act. 
But in reality, she experiences the decision whether to perform the act as very 
much a choice. Looking around her, she sees any number of people who do 
not comply with duty; some portion of those people will deny that the duty at 
issue binds them at all, or in particular circumstances. In some cases, the duty 
to perform A is not owed to any particular person; by choosing to promise one 
obligates oneself to a particular other person. Even where a specific person 
already has a claim on us to do A, promising to do A puts us in a different 
moral position vis-à-vis that individual. We can no longer deny that we are 
obligated to perform A. We concretize and raise the moral stakes of performing 
A. By assuring and inviting reliance, we invite our promisee and others to 
view us as persons who are not only subject to moral duties, but also recognize 
them as binding on ourselves and intend to fulfill them.  Because there are 
so many ways in which we can and do fall short of what duty requires of 
us — in part because the reality of duty is always mediated by uncertainty in 
our judgments about it — the duties that pre-shadow compulsory promises 
do not deprive the latter of their voluntary character altogether.
2. Hierarchies in promise
Accepting that compulsory promises are properly regarded as voluntary, 
one might instead object to the hierarchy of promise described here on the 
grounds that compulsory promises are no less voluntary than promises to do 
what one is free to do or not. After all, rather than representing a lesser case 
of voluntary choice, actions taken to comply with moral reasons may be the 
ultimate expression of freedom. But while actions undertaken just to comply 
with morally binding reasons may be the pinnacle of free action, obligations 
undertaken in order to comply with existing duties do not similarly represent 
a triumph of will over physical inclination — at least compared to promises 
to perform acts one is not already duty-bound to perform. Remember that in 
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mapping the scale of voluntariness, at issue is the relative voluntariness of 
compulsory and supererogatory promises.
Promises made to comply with moral reasons may be more voluntary than 
promises made to pursue worldly ends because motivation by moral reason 
reveals more about a moral agent than do worldly motivations. But precisely 
because agency is valuable (or valued) where it allows an agent to make a 
moral imprint on her environment, the exercise of a normative power is a 
valuable expression of autonomy because it allows us a role in shaping our 
normative relations with others. Promising makes it possible for relational 
commitments to reflect our underlying values and plans.
To the extent that our room for maneuver is constrained by duty, the 
voluntary component of our complete set of obligations is diminished. It is 
not that the voluntary dimension of promises made under moral constraint 
is stamped out altogether. When pushed (but not too hard), we sometimes 
make a choice about the particular direction in which we will go.  But the 
movement is not as voluntary as a decision to stand up and start walking.
Compulsory promises are not less voluntary because the range of acts that 
remain permissible is less altered by such promises than by supererogatory 
promises. I do not propose that the degree of voluntariness in an obligation 
measures the difference between one’s pre- and post-promise set of permissible 
acts. The claim is rather that an obligation is more voluntary the more it 
reflects about the agent that brought it into being. Accordingly, an obligation 
to perform an act that one is already morally compelled to perform is less 
voluntary because the choice to assume the promissory obligation does not 
represent a choice about how to pursue one’s plans or how to allocate one’s 
limited resources. Such a promise reflects less about the particular self that 
makes the promise. By contrast, memories, experiences and simple tastes 
that lead us to prefer one contractual object over another do not undermine 
the voluntary character of our choice; they direct our choices. Those are just 
the kinds of considerations that bring our moral makeup to bear on particular 
transactional decisions.
Since this discussion suggests that voluntariness is best conceptualized as 
a matter of degree, it is worth noting that even some compulsory promises are 
more voluntary than others. The more general, indeterminate and uncertain 
the background duty, the more the promise that discharges that duty is the 
product of moral deliberation. Sometimes the applicability of a background 
duty (e.g., a duty of friendship) depends on a choice to acknowledge and 
accept one’s status as a friend vis-à-vis a prospective promisee. Background 
duties that are the subject of widespread disagreement also render related 
promises less compulsory than in an environment where recognition of the 
background duty reveals nothing particular about the promisor. For example, 
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a promise to help a friend in circumstances where every friend would help is 
less revealing — and less voluntary — than a promise to help a friend where 
many similarly situated persons would not make such a promise.
Some scholars may resist more generally the idea that voluntariness, the 
defining and most normatively interesting feature of promises, can be treated 
as a dimension along which promises vary.22 I do not think Dagan or Heller 
would resist this way of thinking, given their own emphasis on the conditions 
under which choices are made. But there remains some appeal to the idea 
that “a promise is a promise is a promise.”
But we all know it is not so. In ordinary experience, we treat some promises 
as more rigorously binding than others, with wider or narrower conditions 
of excuse. We do not feel equally badly when we break all promises. We are 
likely to feel only moderately guilty if we accidentally miss a party to which 
we suspect we have been invited, and which we agreed to attend, only as a 
formality; we feel worse if we fail to show up for a friend’s wedding, and; we 
feel still more guilty if the wedding was our own.  Given the felt variation in 
the consequences of promise, why suppose there is no significant variation 
in their most important normative feature, i.e., their voluntary character? 
It is after all the feature that explains why they are binding at all. We are 
bound by our promises because they are the product of our moral agency; 
it is unsurprising that we feel more bound where our moral agency explains 
more of the obligation we assumed.
No doubt, some conceptual neatness is lost by allowing for variation in 
voluntariness. A Platonic concept of promise or waiver that encompasses 
all variants of those practices has its place, and indeed, this Article invokes 
such concepts to describe contract in terms of promise and permission. But 
identifying significant common features in compulsory and supererogatory 
promise is not at odds with identifying significant differences between these 
types of promises. Speaking of promises in a differentiated way allows us to 
incorporate more relevant information about a promise into our characterization 
of it, and it is more consistent with ordinary thinking about promises and their 
normative consequences.
22 For example, in the “personal sovereignty” account of autonomy defended by 
Jody Kraus, the principle of autonomy is either satisfied by a regime of contract, 
or it is failed.  See Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 
109 colum. l. rev. 1603 (2009).
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III. contract on the sPectruM of VoluntarIness
So far, I have suggested that we should see promises as varying in their degree 
of voluntariness. Here, I suggest that contracts are systematically of the least 
voluntary sort of promise. That is, they are usually the product of substantial 
material and moral constraint. 
A. Material Constraint
Contracts are usually commercial. They take place in a market. The basic 
requirement of consideration in contract law ferrets out for enforcement 
precisely those promises and permissions that are made in exchange for some 
material benefit.
If promisors in contract make promises for material ends, their promises are 
similarly valued by their promisees for material reasons. By way of contrast, 
consider the context of most ordinary promises. Most private promises create 
or reinforce relationships between promisors and promisees; the point of 
assuming obligation is at least in part to obligate oneself — not merely to 
assure the other of performance. Promising to help a friend if and when she 
may need help has a different effect on a relationship than either handing over 
immediate assistance or handing it over when one observes need. A promise 
creates or reinforces a continuing normative relation, and that is often part of 
its ambition. Promising to help a friend also elevates personal values relating 
to friendship and aid to the status of obligation; and this alteration of the 
moral landscape to reflect one’s values is also its ambition. Whether or not 
the value of assurance makes promises binding, the value of most ordinary 
promises is not reducible to assurance.
Contractual promises do not usually arise out of personal relations. They 
are not intended to create or support personal relationships through building 
blocks of obligation. They do not aim to create obligation per se. They do 
create obligation, but they are intended primarily to offer assurance. Contractual 
promises are commitment devices. The goal is to make more likely and credible 
parties’ compliance with the terms of a planned exchange. The reasons for 
performance of contractual obligation motivate the formation of contract. The 
fact of contract (as opposed to the fact of agreement) merely layers existing 
reasons with a second set of reasons which may better motivate the parties 
to actually perform. But while normative reasons may be among the new 
reasons for performance created by contract, those normative reasons are 
not the point of contract. The point of contracting is the amoral reasons that 
also follow from contract, i.e., reasons relating to the prospect of liability. 
Making a promise legally binding or forfeiting a right in contract is like tying 
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one’s hands to the mast in order to avoid temptation; the legal dimension of 
the commitment is intended only to make one course of conduct more likely 
than another. 
In contract, parties use the state like rope and mast — in order to make 
more likely their compliance with separately conceived obligations. If it were 
possible for parties to achieve the mutual assurance that legal obligation 
provides by some other means, e.g., by having each party ingest a pill that 
will give her small electric shocks when she deviates from the agreed upon 
course of performance, then parties might forego the obligatory structure of 
contract. Indeed, parties probably prefer “self-enforcing” contracts which 
maintain a balance of power throughout contract that motivates each to 
perform in order to maintain the relationship and obtain further performance 
from the other party, without either having to rely on the specter of obligation. 
The need for obligation arises only because (or when) agreements are not 
self-enforcing in this way.
Most contractual promises and waivers are made to assure promisees/
grantees that they will get something in return for conferring something of 
benefit on the promisor/grantor. Because most material needs in a capitalist 
society are met in the marketplace, some contracts (but clearly not all, or even 
most) are used to fulfill basic needs. Thus, once a party has decided she wants 
to eat, live in housing rather than on the street, obtain medical care, etc., she 
has a choice among providers, but she must contract with someone if she is 
to meet those needs. The promises she makes and the permissions she grants 
in order to induce reciprocal promises to provide food, housing, etc., qualify 
as voluntary but they are less voluntary than the typical private promise, in 
which material motivation is either absent or less salient. Similarly, waiver of a 
(default statutory or moral) right to leave or notice where wages are necessary 
for the employee to meet basic needs are less voluntary than waivers granted 
to those on whom one is not materially dependent — including waivers by 
employees with labor market power over their employers.
I take as a starting point that all the promises/permissions discussed above 
are voluntary and morally binding. As discussed above in Part II, even promises 
we make under material constraint reflect important moral deliberation, and 
such thinking differs across agents in a way that makes any promise a moral 
marker to some degree. The choices we make under constraint identify and 
distinguish us from one another.
Contractual promises, forged from material constraint and for material 
benefit, demonstrate the presence and limits of voluntariness. Consumption 
in an inevitably bounded market involves choice about how to allocate one’s 
scarce resources, and these choices are important to how we think about 
ourselves and identify ourselves to others. This may be especially true in the 
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United States.23 For the vast majority of people in developed countries who are 
neither living hand to mouth nor swimming in boundless luxury, contracting 
for goods and services is at once constrictive and expressive.
Understanding the ways in which contractual promises in particular do 
fulfill some of the ethical functions of promising at large should throw into 
relief the ways in which this species of promise is distinguishable and — 
from within the ethical framework of promise itself — often inferior to other 
kinds of promise. Although they are voluntary and valuable, by virtue of their 
material purposes contractual promises are less voluntary in the normatively 
relevant sense than most ordinary (non-legally binding) promises. Contractual 
promises that make it possible for promisors to obtain basic goods and services 
are even less so.
 B. Moral Constraint
At first blush, it might appear that contractual promises are always of the 
supererogatory variety since contract law does not recognize as a consideration 
a commitment to conform to a preexisting duty.24 But this rule refers only 
to legal duties. A commitment that brings a promisor into conformity with a 
moral duty qualifies as a new consideration.25
In fact, by contrast with most ordinary private promises, most contracts 
fall into the category of promises to conform to moral duty. But the relevant 
moral duties are often imperfect.26 They do not require that a person contract 
23 See James Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative 
Law, 117 yale l.J. 407 (2007) (describing centrality of consumer identity in 
American culture).
24 2 U.C.C. § 209 (2004); resTaTemenT (second) oF conTracTs §89 (1981).
25 The point here is that where A and B contract, A and B usually have duties to 
each other outside of contract and their respective promises discharge those 
duties. My point is not that A need not confer consideration on B (or vice versa) 
in light of background duties; to the contrary, the most important duty that A has 
to B (and vice versa) arises as a result of her receiving a material benefit from 
B in connection with the planned exchange (i.e., consideration). In some cases, 
receipt of a material benefit legally obligates the recipient to compensate even 
in the absence of an express promise or agreement (under unjust enrichment, 
restitution or quasi-contract). Those doctrines demonstrate the enforceable 
character of the background duty of reciprocity or fair play.
26 Imperfect duties “prescribe only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves,” 
or “leave[] a playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) 
the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act 
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with the particular party with whom she contracts and do not fully dictate 
the terms.
What are the background duties realized in contract? They are heterogeneous.27 
Some contracts arise from a legal duty to contract. In light of one’s participation 
in a particular line of business, one may have a duty to contract without 
discriminating (e.g., on the basis of race or a preexisting medical condition) 
or in abuse of a market position. Those duties are perfect where the choice 
to offer services or goods to some requires that one be prepared to contract 
with identifiable persons. In the latter cases, contract is actually mandatory. 
But even aside from these exceptional cases of mandatory contract, contract 
is less voluntary to the extent that one complies with a preexisting legal duty 
by contracting with some indeterminate set.
Still more often, contracting is constrained by duties of exchange that are 
not legally binding. In every contract (by virtue of the legal requirements of 
consideration and mutuality of obligation), each party gives up something 
to the other. They do so in accordance with a planned exchange. With the 
arguable exception of conduct within personal relationships, the bare fact 
that one expects to receive something from another person obligates one to 
give something back with or without promise. You may not be required to 
give something in particular back, or to the particular person who conferred a 
benefit on you, but some kinds of payback are adequate and others are not. The 
background moral duty is the duty of reciprocity28 or fair play.29 In promising 
you specify exactly what you will do to comply with duty when it arises.
Duties of reciprocity always underwrite contractual promise because 
obligations are only contractual (legally binding) when they form an exchange. 
Moreover, modern law treats contractual promises as dependent promises, 
in that the obligations of a contracting party do not even go into effect until 
the other party has performed.30 It is thus the receipt of benefit rather than 
the promise to confer a benefit that underwrites the contractual obligation 
and how much one is to do.” See immanuel KanT, The meTaPhysics oF morals 
153 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
27 See Greg Klass, Promise etc., 45 suFFolK u. l. rev. 695, 702-03 (2012).
28 See lawrence becKer, reciProciTy 89-92 (1986) (describing the popular intuition 
that there is a duty to reciprocate and elaborating a virtue-based defense of a 
general moral obligation to reciprocate any benefits received). See also David 
Schmidtz, What We Deserve, and How We Reciprocate, 9 J. eThics 435, 452 
(2005).
29 See John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in law and 
PhilosoPhy 3, 10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural 
Rights?, 64 Phil. rev. 175, 185 (1955).
30 resTaTemenT (second) oF conTracTs § 238 (1981).
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to complete an exchange. Contractual promise creates a new reason for 
complying with one’s obligations, but the duty to compensate the other party 
does not depend on it.
Neither the duty not to induce misplaced reliance nor the duty to compensate 
upon receipt of a material benefit is legally binding per se. Nevertheless, 
both are imminent in the law of contract broadly conceived. Even outside the 
doctrine of consideration, the law of promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, 
unjust enrichment and restitution gives limited legal effect to these background 
duties. These legal doctrines recognize related moral duties even if the legal 
forms do not encompass their moral precursors in their entirety.
One might resist the idea of moral constraint here by characterizing the 
duties of reciprocity as themselves voluntary because one chooses whether or 
not to enter an exchange. But this proves too much, for then most of what we 
owe others may be construed as voluntary. Voluntary obligation is only distinct 
from involuntary duty if it refers to the voluntary assumption of obligation, 
not the voluntariness of conduct that gives rise to obligation.
Reciprocity normally requires that we deliver something in contract 
and imposes some further requirements as to what qualifies as an adequate 
reciprocal benefit.31 Our choice of terms is sometimes further constrained 
by the relationships with the people with whom we contract or others in a 
given contractual community. Choice may be still further morally constrained 
by the burdens of background distributive injustice, which may not permit 
a party to exploit her market position vis-à-vis a particular buyer or seller.32 
The range of contract terms that is morally available is often narrower than it 
appears at first blush, if we begin by assessing all those which we are capable 
of obtaining.
Whatever the particular constraints on a party contemplating contract, those 
background duties are compatible with a range of promises and qualifying 
permissions. A party entering contract chooses the particular promises and 
waivers she makes. But that choice does not come out of nowhere, and the 
reasons she has for making the promises and granting the permissions she 
ultimately makes and grants are not usually of the same sort that motivate 
promises and waivers outside of contract. Material and morally restrictive 
reasons within the world of contract make promise and permission in that 
sphere a less celebratory exercise of moral agency. Promises and permissions 
31 See Thomas Pink, Promising and Obligation, 23 Phil. PersP. 389, 401 (2009).
32 See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 hasTings l.J. 
105 (2008); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PhilosoPhical 
FoundaTions oF conTracT law 193 (Klass et al. eds.,  2014). 
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are voluntary, but contractual promises and contractual permissions tend to 
be less voluntary than others.
conclusIon
This Article endorses enthusiastically Dagan and Heller’s proposition that 
enhancing contractual choice is important to contract, but wonders at the 
selected end point of their argument. Precisely because we must consider the 
choices that contracting parties face before celebrating the fact of their choice 
to contract, we should consider not just the legally recognized contractual 
possibilities but also the market-based and moral limitations that parties face. 
These in turn should inform what kinds of contracts the state enables, and, 
as Dagan and Heller allow, it might turn out to require formally constricting 
choices rather than formally expanding them.
Since most theories of contract take contractual obligation to be voluntary, 
it is a welcome turn to see Dagan and Heller press the quality of choice that 
contracting parties face. But their focus on contract types limits their inquiry 
to legal restrictions on individual transactions; the most severe constraints 
on contractual choice, however, lie elsewhere. This Article has offered a 
picture of contract that is more compatible with theirs than most theories of 
contract, but expands substantially the scope of their critique. Many contractual 
promises poorly reflect the moral agency of contracting parties and for that 
reason should be regarded as less voluntary. To the extent that we defer to 
contracting parties on the terms of their transactions out of respect for the 
voluntary character of those transactions, we should adjust our regulatory 
stance accordingly.

